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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
Intangible inequalities were factors never before considered. However, the
recent decision banning segregation in schools was based primarily on the
psychological damage that segregation engenders in school children, resulting
in a deprivation of equal educational opportunity." It is submitted that this
reasoning could apply to segregation in recreation, although perhaps with
diminished force. Certainly the same feeling of inferiority is present in segre-
gated play as in segregated education.
If it could be assumed that separate recreational facilities may be inherently
as well as physically equal, it may be further argued that segregation of this
kind is not a proper exercise of the state police power since it accomplishes no
reasonable governmental objective. However, the use of the police power in
requiring recreational segregation presents a different and more complex
problem than that involved in segregated education. Prejudice against the
Negroes is highest, except for direct sexual relations, in such personal activities
as bathing, dancing and swimming.1 2 As a result, it would seem a sound
governmental objective to avoid racial antipathies which otherwise would
result from these interracial contacts. Of course a natural aversion to mem-
bers of another race furnishes, in itself, no basis for use of the police power
to enforce segregation; there must be a present and pressing public necessity
for the use of it.13 It would seem that segregated recreation is a proper ex-
ercise of the police power, at least in areas of marked racial antagonisms.
Clearly, segregation is more open to attack under the equal protection clause.
The recent education cases by partial rejection of the "separate but equal"
doctrine, place the whole structure of segregation in serious constitutional
jeopardy. In line with the traditional policy of deciding constitutional ques-
tions only when necessary to resolve the issue at hand, the Supreme Court
has wisely refrained from declaring segregation, per se, unconstitutional.14 Such
a broad declaration would bring down in ruin the traditional southern so-
cial structure. The Court, aware of this non-legal reality, has merely placed
itself in such a position that it can further diminish the scope of the doctrine
upon an occasion of its own choosing, preferably as socio-political conditions
become more favorable toward the Negro. Segregation in recreation, as in
education, tends to deprive the Negro of basically the same intangible bene-
fits that all should receive under an equalitarian constitution. Racial integra-
tion of public recreational facilities is necessary if the Negro is to advance
in his continuing fight for full equality under law.
JAMES H. O'KEEFE
CORPORATIONS - POWER OF CORPORATIONS TO MAKE DONATIONS. - The
stockholders of plaintiff corporation objected to a proposed donation by the
corporation to Princeton University orr the ground that the act was ultra
vires. The corporation sought a declaratory judgment to determine the status
of its power to make such donations. The court held that a corporation was
given such power, both by statutory provisions to that effect and also by the
11. Brown v. Board of Education, supra note 9 at page 494.
12. Myrdal, An American Dilemma, 60, 61 (1944).
13. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
14. Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549 (1947); Ohio By. Co. v. Dittney,
232 U.S. 576 (1914); Southwestern Oil and Gas Co. v. Texas, 217 U.S. 114 (1910);
Eurton v. United States, 196 U.S. 283 (1904).
RECENT CASES
common law. A. P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A. 2d 581 (N.J. 1953),
appeal dismissed 74 Sup. Ct. 107 (U.S. 1953).
The early common law allowed contributions by profit-seeking corporations
only if such contributions were proximately beneficial to the corporation.'
An English Chancellor illustrated the strict application of this rule by stating
"Charity has no business to sit at boards of directors." 2 Another court noted,
"A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit
of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that
end." 3 This common law principle, however, was developed when small
businesses and individuals held most of the wealth, 4 and as corporations grew
larger and wealthier, the laws began to change. Through the years the rules
and their ineterpretations evolved to the point where donations no longer
needed to be proximately beneficial to the corporation to be sustained.
Evans v. Brunner Mond and Co.5 was an early decision expanding the "proxi-
mately beneficial" doctrine of the common law. The corporation had contrib-
uted to several English universities for the "furtherance of scientific research"
and to "promote a reservoir of trained experts" for future employment with the
company. The court held the gift permissable though the benefit derived by
the corporation from the donation was only indirectly beneficial.0 During
the early period of the transition, a New York court permitted a corporate
donation, simply stating that industrial conditions must change with business
methods, and acts become permissable which at an earlier period would not
have been considered within corporate power.7 Following this precedent,
gifts to schools,8 churches, 9 and support of projects to increase customers 19
which would therefore have doubtless been ultra vires, were held to be intra
vires.
Our Federal tax laws since 1939 have given an implied sanction to the
liberal donation theory. A corporation is allowed to deduct gifts to charities
up to five percent of its net income." The Federal policy is further reflected
1. Hutton v. West Cork By. Co., 23 Ch. D. 654, 673 (1883).
2. Ibid. (concurring opinion).
3. Dodge v. Ford, Motor Co. 204 Mich 459, 170 N.W. 668, 684, (1919) (holding
dealt wth power of corporation to re-invest its surplus in the plant).
4. See Bell, Corporation Support of Education: The Legal Basis, 38 A.B.A.J. 119
(1952); Bleichen, Corporate Contributions to Charities: The Modern Rule, 30 A.B.A.J.
999 (1952).
5. 1 Ch. 359 (1920).
6. American Rolling Mill Co. v. CIR, 41 F.2d 314 (6th Cir. 1930); Greene County
Nat'l Farm Loan Ass'n v. Federal Land Bank of Louisville, 57 F. Supp. 783 (D. Ky.,
1944), cert. denied 328 U.S. 834 (1945).
7. Steinway v. Steinway and Sons, 17 Misc. 43, 40 N.Y. Supp. 718, 720 (1896).
(allowed corporation in an isolated community to contribute to the building of a church,
school and library because it insured faithful services of employees). See also People
ex rel. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Hotchkiss, 136 App. Div. 150, 120 N.Y. Supp.
649, 651 (1909) (allowed the building of a hospital because it promoted employer
and employee relations).
8. Whetstone v. Ottawa, 13 Kan. 240 (1874), (donation of property to school al-
lowed because a "direct" benefit was shown); F. F. Wood Motor Co., 1 B.T.A. 1246
(1925). But see People ex rel. Maloney v. Pullman Palace Car. Co., 175 Ill. 125, 51
N.E. 644 (1898) (held to be beyond its powers for corporation to provide a school
for its employees' children).
9. Poinsett Mills, 1 B.T.A. 7 (1924).
10. Richelieu Hotel Co. v. International Military Encampment Co., 140 11. 248, 29
N.E. 1044 (1892), (corporation allowed to donate to the establishment of an .nter-
national military encampment); In re San Francisco Exposition, 50 F. Supp. 344
(N.D. Cal. 1943).
11. Int. Rev. Code § 23 (q).
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by such cases as that allowing as an extraordinary and necessary business
expense, amounts contributed by a corportaion for construction of a city hos-
pital where two-thirds of the citizens were employees of the corporation."2
Twenty-nine states have adopted statutes which further define a corpora-
tion's power to make donations.13 Some require that the gift must contribute
to public welfare, civic betterment or charitable purposes. 4 Others permit
gifts to a restricted class of recipients, with a general power to make dona-
tions for the public Welfare but with restrictions on the funds that may be
used, or the percentage of net income that may be given. 15 Oklahoma has
given perhaps the greatest freedom of donative power; under its statute the
directors of a corporation may make gifts to charitable enterprises if in their
judgment the public interest will be served or the corporation itself will
benefit.";
Since the enactment of this type of legislation, the gifts from corporations
have risen from thirty to two hundred sixty million dollars a year.' 7 This
clearly indicates the value of such legislation.
INSANE PERSONS - DUE PROCESS OF LAW - NON-JUDICIAL COMMIT'MENT
OF MENTALLY ILL IN NON-EMERGENCY CASES. - Proceeding in mandamus
to compel the admission of a mentally ill individual to a state mental hospital.
Admission had been refused on the grounds that the commitment procedure
under the Missouri statute 1 was violative of the due process clauses of the
state2 and federal constitutions. 3 The statute provided for the non-judicial
commitment of the mentally ill. By its terms the alleged insane person could
]w committed for an indefinite term upon the application of a friend, relative,
or health officer and the submission of a certificate signed by two doctors
stating that the individual was mentally ill and a danger to himself and the
community. The statute further provided for a hearing on appeal if de-
manded by either the patient, guardian or relative. The court held that the
Missouri staute violated due process in denying the individual his right to
to hearing and notice before commitment. State ex tel. Fuller v. Mullinax,
269 S.W. 2d 72, (Mo. 1954).
Little uniformity exists in either statutory provisions or judicial decisions
with respect to the commitment proceeding. 4 The difficulty in classifying
the nature of the action, whether it is primarily criminal, civil or of hybrid
form, and the use of judicial procedure in some jurisdictions and administra-
12. Corning Glass Works v. Lucas, 37 F. 2d 798 (D.C. Cir. 1929), cert. denied 281
U.S. 742 (1930).
13. Ballantine, Corporations §85 (1946); Bell, Corporation Support of Education:
The Legal Basis, 38 A.B.A.J 119 (1952).
14. Ark. Laws 1951, c. 69. Cal. Laws 1951, c. 564.
15. Va. Laws 1950, c. 574 p. 1309. New York Laws 1949 c. 171, J 14:3-13.
16. Okla. Laws 1949, Title 18, c. A.
17. Bell, Corporation Support of Education: The Legal Basis. 38 A.B.A.J. 119
(1952).
1. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 202.780 to 202.870 (1949).
2. Mo. Const. Art. I § 10.
3. U.S. Const. Amend. XIV.
4. Though it is generally agreed that the hearing on insanity is not a criminal action.
but essentially civil, the fact that there is no adverse party makes classification difficult.
The form may vary from a trial before judge and jury, or hearing before a judge alone.
to a hearing before a county commission composed of a judge, doctor and lawyer. N.D.
Rev. Code J 25-0301 (1943).
